Nietzsche Knew: Becoming Yourself Takes Novelty
Nobody told the participants to sit up straight. That was the whole point. Manipulating posture implicitly through environmental constraints influences mood and risk-taking behaviour, published August 3, 2026 in the British Journal of Psychology by McGill researchers Soren Wainio-Theberge and Jorge Armony, propped some participantsâ tablets up on a stand and left others flat on a low desk, with no instruction and no mention of posture at all, and still found the upright group felt more pride, reported better mood, and made measurably sharper decisions than the group left to hunch. Xunzi wouldnât have been surprised. Writing in the third century BCE, in direct opposition to Menciusâs claim that goodness is already inside us, waiting to sprout, Xunzi argued the opposite: nature starts crooked, and it gets straightened only by external forms (ritual, deportment, the way you hold your body) imposed deliberately, from the outside in, until they become who you are.
| Question | What we found |
|---|---|
| Who ran the study? | Soren Wainio-Theberge and Jorge Armony, McGill University |
| Where and when? | British Journal of Psychology, published August 3, 2026 |
| How big was it? | Nearly 200 participants from the McGill community |
| How was posture manipulated? | Indirectly: a tablet on a raised stand encouraged upright sitting; a tablet flat on a low desk encouraged hunching. No participant was told to change posture |
| What did they find? | Upright sitters reported significantly more pride and positive mood, took bigger risks in a decision task, and earned higher rewards than the hunched group |
| What did Xunzi argue? | Human nature is crooked at the start (xing e, ć§ćĄ) and is straightened only through deliberately practiced external forms (ritual, bearing, li, 猎) that train the mind from the outside in |
The Quick Version
A 2026 McGill study nudged nearly 200 people into upright or hunched posture using nothing but tablet height, then watched what happened to their mood and decision-making. The upright group felt more pride, reported better mood, and took smarter risks â bigger bets that also paid off more, not just riskier ones. Xunzi, arguing against Mencius twenty-three centuries earlier, said this is exactly how virtue works: you donât wait for the right feeling to arrive from inside. You impose the right form on the outside (the bow, the posture) and the mind eventually catches up to the body.
Most posture research asks people to sit up straight and then checks whether they feel different â which tells you something, but itâs contaminated by the obvious problem that people whoâve just been told âsit up straight, weâre measuring your moodâ are primed to report feeling better regardless of what their spine is doing. Wainio-Theberge and Armony wanted the posture effect without the demand-characteristic noise, so they built an experiment where nobody was ever asked to change how they sat.
They recruited nearly 200 people from the McGill community and ran them through an initial task on a standard computer monitor. Then, under the guise of testing a mobile application, participants moved to a tablet. For one group, the tablet sat on a stand on an adjustable table â positioned to make an upright posture the comfortable, natural way to sit. For the other, the tablet lay flat on a desk set at a lower height, which pulled people forward into a hunch. Video software tracked neck angle to confirm the manipulation actually worked, and it did â reliably, without anyone in either group being told what the study was actually testing.
Then came the decision task: a risk-taking exercise built around inflating a virtual balloon, where each pump earns more reward but raises the odds the balloon pops and the reward disappears. Itâs a clean way to measure risk-taking that isnât just âdid they gamble moreâ but âdid they gamble well.â The upright group took bigger risks and also earned more from them. Armonyâs own framing of that distinction, reported by ScienceDaily, is worth sitting with: the results âsuggest they were not acting more impulsively but rather were engaging in more effective risk-taking.â Not recklessness. Calibration. The upright group also reported significantly higher pride and more positive mood than the hunched group â feelings that, in the studyâs account, plausibly sit upstream of the better-calibrated risk-taking rather than riding along beside it as a separate effect. Armony was candid, per McGillâs own writeup, that the effects were modest and observed under controlled lab conditions â posture isnât a life hack that rewires anyoneâs decision-making. But the direction of the effect, produced entirely by furniture and never by instruction, is the part that should stop you mid-slouch.
Xunzi wasnât running a balloon task. He had no tablets, no adjustable desks, no way to measure neck angle or self-reported pride. What he had instead was a flat disagreement with the most famous Confucian who came before him, and an argument built to survive it.
Mencius had argued that human beings are born with the seeds of virtue already inside them â compassion, shame, deference, moral judgment, present from birth like a sprout waiting for the right conditions to grow. Xunzi rejected this directly. In the chapter known as Xing E, âHuman Nature Is Evilâ, he opens with about as blunt a thesis as classical Chinese philosophy produces: human nature is e (ćĄ) â crooked, self-interested, prone toward âcontention, seizing⌠licentiousness and disorderâ â and whatever good exists in a person is wei (ĺ˝), artificial, deliberately constructed. Left alone, he argued, people donât drift toward virtue. They drift toward taking what they want.
His central image is the one that makes the posture study feel less like a coincidence and more like a rediscovery. A warped piece of wood, Xunzi writes, âmust necessarily undergo clamping and steaming before it can become straight â this is because its inherent nature is not straight.â You donât talk the wood into being straight. You donât wait for it to feel like straightening itself. You clamp it, steam it, and hold it in the corrected shape until the correction becomes permanent. Human nature, in his account, needs the identical treatment: âthe governance of sage kingsâ and transformation âby rites and righteousnessâ before order can emerge at all. Not because people are hopeless. Because straightness isnât the starting condition, and pretending otherwise leaves the crookedness to run the show.
The mechanism he names for this is li (猎) â usually translated as ritual, but closer in practice to formalized bearing: the bow, the seating order, the correct way to stand at a ceremony, the deliberate posture of respect. In the Li Lun, his treatise on ritual, Xunzi describes li as governing deportment and emotional expression across contexts â how you hold yourself at a joyful occasion versus a funeral â and argues that repeated practice of these external forms is what produces internal virtue, not the reverse. You donât feel reverent and then bow. You bow, repeatedly, deliberately, in the correct form, and reverence is what eventually shows up inside a person whoâs done that long enough. Get the outside right on purpose, long enough, and the inside follows. Thatâs not a metaphor for Xunzi. Itâs the mechanism.
Which is what the McGill data quietly demonstrates on a much smaller timescale. Nobody in the upright-tablet group decided to feel proud and then sat up to express it. The sitting came first, imposed by furniture they didnât choose and werenât told to notice. The pride, the better mood, the sharper risk calibration â all of it followed the posture. This site has covered Confuciusâs own account of relational virtue, which Xunzi considered himself a defender of even while breaking sharply with Mencius on where virtue originates. The through-line from Confucius to Xunzi is the same claim the posture study makes almost by accident: character isnât purely something you excavate from within. Some of it gets built by the forms youâre placed in, or that you place yourself in, before youâve decided to feel anything about them at all.
This isnât a case for reading a single lab study as proof that Xunzi secretly ran a psychology experiment, and it isnât a case for treating âupright posture improves a balloon-inflation taskâ and âritual straightens human natureâ as the same claim in different clothes.
Start with scale. Wainio-Theberge and Armony measured a modest effect in a controlled lab setting, over one session, on one decision task. Xunzi is making a claim about the entire moral formation of a person across a lifetime of practiced ritual â the li that governs how you mourn, how you greet an elder, how you conduct yourself at court. A tablet stand for twenty minutes is not a system of ritual sustained across a life. Collapsing those two claims into âscience proves Xunzi rightâ flattens the size of what he was actually arguing.
Thereâs also a real tension worth naming honestly instead of smoothing over: this site covered a study earlier this year where brief mindfulness meditation increased risk-taking by dulling the fear response that normally keeps people cautious â a case where reduced inhibition looked like a problem, not an improvement. The posture studyâs upright group also took bigger risks. The difference is that they earned more from doing it â Armonyâs own read is that this was better-calibrated confidence, not blunted caution. But itâs worth sitting with the fact that âtook bigger risksâ isnât automatically good news on its own; it depends entirely on whether the confidence behind it is accurate or just louder.
And Xunziâs own theory has a limit thatâs easy to skip past because itâs inconvenient: if virtue only comes from external ritual, imposed by âsage kingsâ and teachers, that leaves open an uncomfortable question about who gets to design the ritual, and what happens to people raised inside bad or coercive versions of it. Xunzi has answers to this â the sage kings, in his account, got the ritual right because they observed what actually produces order â but itâs a genuine weak point, not a footnote. External forms can straighten. They can also just as easily discipline someone into compliance that has nothing to do with virtue. The posture study canât adjudicate that question, and neither can a chapter written in the third century BCE.
Neither the McGill researchers nor Xunzi wrote this as a five-step plan, but the shared shape of their arguments points somewhere concrete.
Xunzi wasnât measuring neck angle or balloon-task earnings. He was arguing against a rival philosopherâs picture of human nature, using the clamped and steamed piece of wood as his proof that straightness has to be imposed before it can become real. Wainio-Theberge and Armony built the small, controlled, twenty-first-century version of the identical claim: change the external form â nothing else, no instruction, no appeal to feeling â and the internal state follows it anyway.
Mencius said the sprout is already there, waiting to grow on its own terms. This siteâs earlier look at Menciusâs case took that argument seriously, because it deserves to be. Xunzi said the wood is crooked, and virtue is what you get from clamping it â deliberately, repeatedly, from the outside â until the straightness holds without the clamp. Nearly two hundred people at McGill sat differently for one afternoon, without being told why, and came out the other side prouder, steadier, and better at reading a bet. Thatâs not a lifetime of ritual. But itâs the same argument, in miniature, and it landed on Xunziâs side of the debate.
This post discusses a 2026 psychology study on posture and decision-making and a classical philosophical text. It isnât a substitute for professional guidance on mental health or chronic pain. If posture-related discomfort or persistent low mood and confidence are affecting daily life, a physical therapist or a mental health professional can help in ways a tablet stand canât.