Hegel Knew: We Judge the Climb, Not the Summit
Put a pair of eye-tracking glasses on 39 strangers, drop them into a negotiation, and measure where their eyes actually land. That’s what a team of Austrian researchers did, and what they found wasn’t about what anyone said. It was about where they looked while saying it. Eyes on the Leader: Gaze Behavior as a Cue for Follower Conscientiousness, published in the Journal of Applied Social Psychology on September 24, 2026 by Simon Liegl, Thomas Maran, Marco Furtner, and Pierre Sachse, found that followers who held more eye contact with a leader’s eyes — specifically while they themselves were speaking, not while listening — got rated by observers as more conscientious. That held regardless of what their actual conscientiousness scores said. The gaze itself was doing the convincing.
Erving Goffman would not have been surprised, and he said so in 1959, decades before anyone strapped a camera to a negotiator’s face. His claim in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life was that people judge you by what he called “expressive signs given off” — the posture, the tone, the eyes — and not by whatever’s actually happening inside you. This study didn’t discover that gaze can look like sincerity. It measured it.
| Question | What we found |
|---|---|
| What was studied? | Whether followers’ eye contact with a leader, measured by mobile eye-tracking, predicts and signals their conscientiousness |
| Who ran it? | Simon Liegl, Thomas Maran, Marco Furtner, and Pierre Sachse |
| Where and when? | Journal of Applied Social Psychology, published Sep 24, 2026; covered by PsyPost the same day |
| Sample | 39 university students (21 men), average age 24, wearing mobile eye-tracking glasses through a four-round negotiation task |
| Core finding | Self-rated conscientiousness tracked with more frequent gaze at the leader’s eyes while speaking, not while listening |
| Observer finding | Participants who directed more gaze at the leader were rated as more conscientious by outside observers — gaze mediated the link between self-rated and observer-rated conscientiousness |
| The twist | Openness to experience showed the opposite pattern: more open participants made less eye contact while speaking |
| What Goffman already argued | The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959): people are judged by “expressive signs given off,” not by verified inner traits |
The Quick Version
A 2026 study put mobile eye-tracking glasses on 39 university students during a four-round negotiation and found that people who scored themselves higher on conscientiousness looked at their leader’s eyes more while making their case — not while listening. Observers picked up on that gaze and rated those participants as more conscientious, whether or not their actual trait scores backed it up. Erving Goffman called this dynamic in 1959: people read you by the signs you give off, not by an audit of your character. This is that theory with an eye-tracking dataset attached to it.
The setup wasn’t a survey. It was a live task — a version of the New Recruit Negotiation, a standard exercise in organizational research, adapted here for a leader and a small group of followers arguing over compensation. Across four rounds, the leader made offers and each follower took a turn presenting their case for what they wanted. Everyone wore mobile eye-tracking glasses the entire time, which meant the researchers weren’t asking anyone to report where they’d looked. They had the actual gaze data, timestamped, tied to who was speaking and who was listening at each moment.
Two questions were sitting inside that data. First: does a person’s own conscientiousness predict how they use their eyes? Second, and more interesting: does how they use their eyes predict how other people read them? The answers didn’t line up the way a simple “confident people make eye contact” story would predict.
On the first question, the gaze pattern was specific in a way that matters. It wasn’t that conscientious followers looked at the leader more in general — listening included. It was narrower than that. The eye contact spiked specifically while they were speaking, aimed specifically at the leader’s eyes, not their face generally or the room at large. The researchers put it directly: more conscientious followers appear to “instrumentalize their gaze when speaking and direct it at the leader to support their own arguments.” That’s a precise claim. It’s not “conscientious people are more attentive.” It’s “conscientious people deploy their eyes, at the exact moment they need to be believed.”
On the second question — whether that gaze actually worked — it did. Observers rated participants who gazed more at the leader as more conscientious. And the gaze wasn’t just correlated alongside the real trait score; it was doing the mediating work between what a person actually reported about their own conscientiousness and what a stranger, watching from outside, concluded about them. Put plainly: the visible behavior was the thing being judged. Not the underlying disposition it was supposedly reporting on.
Then there’s the finding that complicates any tidy “just make more eye contact” takeaway. Openness to experience ran the other direction — people higher in openness made less eye contact while speaking, not more. Gaze isn’t a universal honesty dial you can crank up to seem better across the board. It’s a specific signal, tied to a specific trait, and it means something different depending on what a person is actually trying to project.
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), Erving Goffman argued that social life works like theater: people manage a “front” — appearance, manner, setting — to control the impression they make on an audience. He split the signals people send into two kinds: the ones we consciously “give,” like words and claimed traits, and the much larger set we “give off” — posture, tone, and yes, where our eyes go — which observers actually trust more, because they seem harder to fake.
This is the half of Goffman that gets flattened when people reduce him to “we’re all just performing.” He wasn’t only describing con artists working a room. He was describing every job interview, every first date, every negotiation where you want to be read a certain way — and pointing out that the signals people find most convincing aren’t the ones you’re choosing on purpose. They’re the ones that leak out around the edges of what you meant to say. Gaze is exactly that kind of leak. Nobody walks into a negotiation thinking “I will now perform conscientiousness with my eyeballs.” The instrumentalizing happens below the level anyone would call calculated, which is precisely why it reads as sincere.
Goffman drew a line that this study accidentally tests, and it’s worth being honest about which side of it the finding lands on.
He distinguished the sincere performer — someone who genuinely believes their own act, who isn’t gaming anyone because they’ve internalized the role — from the cynical performer, who knows it’s a performance and runs it deliberately for effect. His argument was that most people, most of the time, are the first kind. You’re not lying when you look composed in a meeting where you feel anything but. You’ve absorbed the performance so completely it doesn’t register as one.
The gaze finding fits the sincere reading better than the cynical one, and that matters for what you do with it. Nobody in that negotiation room was coached to lock eyes with the leader while talking. The eye contact tracked with self-reported conscientiousness in a way that looks like an unconscious habit of genuinely conscientious people — showing up, staying engaged, following through on making a point — rather than a trick anyone deployed on purpose. Which means the study isn’t really evidence that you can fake conscientiousness by staring harder. It’s evidence that a real trait happens to leave a visible trace, and that observers have learned, correctly or not, to read that trace as meaningful.
The connection here isn’t “a sociologist predicted a correlation coefficient in 1959.” It’s narrower, and I think it holds up better for being narrower: Goffman’s claim was that impressions form from signs, not from direct access to anyone’s actual character — and that some signs carry more weight than others precisely because they seem involuntary. Liegl’s team found one of those signs operating in real time, with a number attached. Gaze while speaking wasn’t a report on conscientiousness. It was a stand-in for it, and observers treated the stand-in as good enough.
This tracks with what this site has covered on Rousseau’s amour propre — the need to be seen a certain way by others, which Rousseau thought corrupted people the more they organized their behavior around it. Goffman’s frame is less pessimistic than Rousseau’s; managing an impression isn’t automatically corruption, in his account, it’s just how social life works. But both are describing the same basic fact: what other people conclude about you runs through what you display, not through some clean channel to your actual interior.
It also sits usefully next to Sartre’s account of bad faith. Sartre worried about people who fully collapse into a role and mistake the performance for the whole of who they are — the waiter who becomes only “waiter,” nothing underneath. Goffman would say that collapse is closer to the norm than Sartre wanted to admit, and less damning: the sincere performer isn’t in bad faith. They’ve just built a self that includes the performance, and the gaze study is a small piece of evidence for how automatic that building process is.
And Charles Taylor’s argument that authenticity has rules cuts against any reading of this study as permission to manipulate people with eye contact. Taylor’s point was that authenticity was never “do whatever feels true to you in isolation” — it’s always answerable to a horizon of meaning outside yourself, including the people reading your signals. A gaze that’s honestly yours, shaped by a real disposition, is a different object than a gaze deployed as a tactic, even if an observer can’t always tell the difference from outside. Goffman knew that too. It’s why he cared about the distinction between sincere and cynical performance in the first place, rather than treating all performance as equally hollow.
It’s worth being precise about the size of this, because it would be easy to overstate it.
It doesn’t show that eye contact causes anyone to become more conscientious, or that staring at your boss will manufacture a trait you don’t have. The design measured association within a specific task, not a training intervention. It doesn’t show the effect generalizes past a negotiation setting, either — 39 university students in a structured exercise is a narrow sample, and workplace meetings, dates, and interviews all carry their own norms about what eye contact means. And it doesn’t mean gaze is a lie detector working in reverse, some way to spot the genuinely conscientious person in a room. The mediation finding says observers respond to the gaze. It doesn’t say the gaze is a reliable window into who’s actually reliable.
It also doesn’t settle the ethics of using this on purpose. If instrumentalizing your gaze while speaking is mostly something sincere performers do without noticing, deliberately copying it moves you toward the cynical end of Goffman’s spectrum — closer to performing conscientiousness than having it. The study measured what conscientious people happen to do. It didn’t test what happens when someone fakes the behavior on purpose, and Goffman’s own framework gives reasons to think that’s a different, riskier act.
Goffman never ran a negotiation task, and he certainly never saw a pair of eye-tracking glasses. But he spent a career arguing that character shows up as behavior long before it shows up as anything anyone can verify, and that the behavior gets judged on its own terms. Liegl’s team just handed him the receipt: thirty-nine people negotiating over money, and the thing that moved the room’s opinion of who was reliable wasn’t reliability. It was where thirty-nine pairs of eyes happened to land while their owners were busy trying to be believed.
This post discusses a 2026 eye-tracking study and a 1959 work of sociology. It isn’t advice to perform eye contact strategically, and the study’s findings come from a single negotiation task with 39 participants — they aren’t a universal rule for how to seem trustworthy in every setting.