Nietzsche Knew: Becoming Yourself Takes Novelty
Which produces a happier society: citizens each pursuing their own happiness, or a society built to help people enhance each other’s? Researchers just ran that question through data from 97,220 people in 66 countries. The answer wasn’t close. Global mapping of happiness: mechanisms, drivers, and pathways to societal happiness, published in The Journal of Positive Psychology in 2026, found the communitarian pathway significantly outperforms the individualistic one. Alasdair MacIntyre made the same argument in 1981, in a book about virtue that never mentions a single regression coefficient.
| Question | What the research found |
|---|---|
| Who ran the study? | Ewa Palikot (Polish Academy of Sciences), with Brian W. Haas, Kosuke Takemura, and Kuba KryĹ› |
| How big was it? | 97,220 people across 66 countries, drawn from World Values Survey data |
| What did they test? | Over 200 hypothesized mechanisms linking society-level factors to happiness |
| How many held up? | 56 mechanisms significantly associated with happiness, sorted into five drivers |
| Individualistic vs. communitarian — which pathway won? | Communitarian, and not narrowly |
| What did Alasdair MacIntyre argue in 1981? | That virtue and a flourishing life are only intelligible within a community bound by shared practices and tradition — not through detached individual pursuit |
The Quick Version
A 2026 study modeled two competing routes to societal happiness: let individuals chase their own good, or build a society where people are structured to enhance each other’s. Across 97,220 respondents in 66 countries, the communitarian route won. Alasdair MacIntyre spent After Virtue arguing that Enlightenment liberalism had it backwards — that a self stripped of community and tradition can’t even locate what virtue means, let alone practice it. The dataset didn’t exist when he wrote that. It agrees with him anyway.
Ewa Palikot and her co-authors, Brian W. Haas, Kosuke Takemura, and Kuba Kryś, started from a genuinely unresolved question in happiness research: does a happy society just add up from happy individuals, or is it something else entirely? Psypost’s coverage of the study frames Palikot’s own summary of the stakes bluntly: “A happy society is more than just a collection of happy individuals.”
To test it, the team pulled World Values Survey responses from 97,220 people across 66 countries and built statistical models operating at both the individual and country level, controlling for age, gender, education, social status, and national economic wealth. Then they threw a wide net — over 200 hypothesized mechanisms pulled from prior research on what makes societies happy. Fifty-six of them held up under scrutiny.
Those 56 sorted into five drivers: individual emancipation (autonomy, equality, minority acceptance), Enlightenment values (science, human rights, democracy, reason), basic human needs (food, shelter, healthcare), effective governing and security institutions, and close in-group ties. The researchers then modeled two competing pathways built from those drivers. The individualistic pathway: let citizens take care of their own happiness, and societal happiness follows as a byproduct. The communitarian pathway: build a society where the structure itself pushes individuals to enhance the happiness of people around them. Not a personality trait. A pathway — something a society can be built toward or away from.
The communitarian pathway won, and Phys.org’s writeup of the findings put the takeaway in plain terms: a society’s overall wellbeing can’t be calculated by simply summing up individual happiness levels. Something about the connective tissue between people carries weight that individual-level happiness scores don’t capture on their own.
Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, published in 1981, wasn’t trying to measure anything. It was trying to explain why modern moral argument had gone incoherent — why people talk past each other about right and wrong with no shared way to settle it. His diagnosis: Enlightenment liberalism tried to build morality out of the autonomous individual, stripped of community, tradition, and the practices that used to give virtue its content. That project, he argued, couldn’t work. Not because individualism is unpleasant, but because it removes the only soil virtue can actually grow in.
MacIntyre’s alternative isn’t vague communitarian sentiment. It’s structural. He defines practices — chess, medicine, farming, a craft, a discipline — as socially organized activities with standards of excellence that only make sense inside a community of people pursuing them together, across generations. You don’t invent what counts as a good chess move or a good diagnosis alone in a room. You inherit it, get corrected by people better than you, and eventually pass it on. Virtue, in MacIntyre’s account, is what lets a person sustain those practices and the traditions that carry them forward.
As the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes his position, MacIntyre writes plainly that “the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities.” A person imagined as a blank, unencumbered chooser — the Enlightenment liberal individual — isn’t a richer, freer version of the self. It’s a self with the context stripped out, and stripped-out selves can’t do the one thing virtue requires: act well within a shared history of what “well” means here. Virtues, he adds, are what sustain “those traditions which provide both practices and individual lives with their necessary historical context.” Individualism doesn’t liberate the self from that context. It just makes the self unable to explain itself.
The 2026 study never cites MacIntyre. It didn’t need to. It built two structural models — one where happiness starts and ends with the individual, one where it’s produced through the individual’s relation to others — and the second one won on data he was reasoning toward from a library in Indiana in 1980.
The communitarian pathway is a model of societal happiness in which a society structures itself so individuals enhance the happiness of the people around them, rather than each person pursuing personal happiness in isolation. Palikot and colleagues found this pathway, built from drivers like close in-group ties and effective governing institutions, significantly outperforms an individualistic model where societal happiness is treated as the sum of separately pursued personal goods.
A few consistent reasons show up across the 2026 findings and MacIntyre’s older argument for why the communitarian route wins:
This isn’t a case against individual happiness, and neither Palikot’s team nor MacIntyre would back that reading.
The individualistic pathway still contributes to societal happiness in the study’s models — it just doesn’t win the comparison. Nobody involved is arguing that personal ambition, solitude, or private pursuits are corrosive. Solitude and loneliness aren’t the same thing, and a study about societal-level pathways says nothing about whether any individual person needs more alone time or more company right now.
It’s also worth being honest about what a cross-sectional survey model can and can’t establish. The World Values Survey data shows association at scale across countries, not a randomized experiment proving that adding communitarian policy to any given nation causes happiness to rise. Country-level factors like governance quality and economic development are tangled together in ways 56 mechanisms can describe better than they can fully untangle. And MacIntyre’s argument was never empirical to begin with — it’s a philosophical case about what virtue requires conceptually, built from Aristotle and a critique of Enlightenment ethics, not from World Values Survey rounds.
Community also isn’t a cure for what actually needs clinical attention. If persistent depression or isolation-driven anxiety is the real problem, “invest in your in-group ties” is a reasonable long-term direction, not a substitute for professional support.
Neither the researchers nor MacIntyre wrote an exercise, but the shared shape of their arguments points somewhere concrete.
MacIntyre wasn’t modeling 66 countries. He was reading Aristotle against the Enlightenment philosophers who tried to ground morality in the autonomous, unencumbered individual, and concluding that the project was self-defeating — that virtue only becomes intelligible inside a community bound by shared practices and a tradition that outlives any one person’s private reasoning. He built that case from argument, not survey data, and it’s spent four decades getting debated in philosophy departments rather than settled.
Palikot, Haas, Takemura, and Kryś built the empirical version from a completely different direction — World Values Survey responses, 200-plus candidate mechanisms, 56 that survived, and a model comparison that came out lopsided. This isn’t the first time this pattern has shown up on this site this month — Isaiah Berlin’s value pluralism turned up in a 2025 purpose study, and mattering research keeps finding that purpose grows from small, specific connections rather than grand individual missions. MacIntyre’s version just states the mechanism more directly: a self without community isn’t a freer self. It’s a self without the resources to know what a good life would even look like.
This post discusses cross-national survey research on societal happiness and a philosophical argument about virtue and community. It isn’t a substitute for professional guidance on mental health. If isolation or persistent low mood is affecting daily life, a therapist or physician can help in ways a philosophy essay can’t.